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This paper is intended to give some alternative positive suggestion on how to
cope with the must of the cutting off the oil subsidy domestically. The problem
that faced by the government is that the compensation fund will hardly enjoyed
by the poor, and moreover it is hard to watch out the whole process. The other
conditions that faced by the government is the economical inequality that shall be
overcome to prepare the world market era. This paper suggests on making such a
preparation by the rising up the progressive tax on luxurious goods indirectly.
This will make the culture that decreasing the consumption on luxurious goods for
the rich, and higher the economical equality for the poor. This will be far from
spoiling the poor (as by the coupon distribution for the poor), and even more
balancing the government revenue for the sake of economical resurrection in
Indonesia.
Keywords: Oil Price, Indonesia, subsidy, progressive tax, indirect tax, Lorentz
curve, equality, Cobb-Douglas.
1. Introduction
There are many analysis for the macroeconomic impacts on oil-price
shocks or the rice of oil price (Jones & Leiby:1996). But here, we will analyze the
conditions that faced by Indonesia for the rising of the oil price nationally, as the
oil price in Indonesia is most subsidized. Thus the issue of the hike of oil price in
Indonesia become more specific as the rise of oil-price will be concerned with the
withdrawal of the oil subsidy.
Everyone that understands the conditions of international oil price can
easily say that the Indonesia’s domestic oil price is low. This is caused by the
subsidy that paid by the government of Indonesia concerning the economical
conditions of the citizens. But unfortunately, the demand for the facing of the
global market and the bonding with the treatment of economical restructurisation
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has force the government to raise the
domestic oil price to be equal with the international oil price
1. But truly this
reason will not be said to be the main reason by the government as it touched the
national sentiment and dignity. The reason used by the government that sounded
by the press is that the subsidy is not healthy for the citizen economically. The
subsidy is not benefited the poor but much benefited the rich as they get the
same oil price while the financial conditions are very much different. By this logic,
the hike of oil price will simultaneously be made with the compensation fund for
the poor. This paper will try to describe that the logic becoming the background
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of the policy is absurd and the economical equity of the citizens can be gained
better in other way.
The facts that focused by this paper is:
-  The big gap between the poor and the rich in Indonesia.
-  The oil subsidy is still needed by the people until such economical conditions
of national equity.
-  The cases of low participation on employment in Indonesia.
-  The corrupt system of governance that should be reduced step by step.
By concerning the conditions above, we will analyze the hike of domestic oil price
(withdrawal of oil subsidy) and the economical impacts that may be risen by
offering alternative solutions that lower the social gap between the rich and the
poor.  This will help to make the people ready for the competition era in the
market global. By the time, the people will be much ready for the same oil price
with the international one.
2. Macroeconomic impacts of the national hike of oil price
Here we use the modified Cobb-Douglas-production function to analyze the
macroeconomic impact of the rise of oil price (Dullien:2000).
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while K = capital, L = labor, E = energy, and A = technological process. Assume
the technological progress A=1, we can derive the oil price and real wages as:
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By this, we can consequently see the impacts of the oil price to the real wages (of
the employment) as:
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By the equation above we can see that the rise of the oil price domestically will
fall the real wage, as this will make the unemployment become restless. In
Indonesia the restless unemployment has a great probability on turning out to be
crime (Hariadi:2003). It will be described later that the rise of the oil price will
also rise the price of house-hold goods since the rising of the production-cost of
industries while the demand for energy does not fall as much as the energy price
increases. Moreover the rising of the oil price domestically must calculated
beyond the ability of the citizens to cope with. The second-round impact of rising
oil price is very dangerous to the sustainability of some primer economical sectors
such as the fishermen
2, etc. For rural populations, oil price will be boomed as the
hike oil price simultaneously will rise the price of distribution.
Dullien (2000) has shown that the only positive fiscal policy to cope with
the rising oil price is to give more subsidy while in the other hand to rise the
taxation of goods, i.e.: VAT
3, etc. Perhaps, this is good for Indonesia, but this
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papers will describe some more plausible solution concerning the economical
inequality trends of the population in Indonesia.
3. The problem of inequality in Indonesia
There is a unique problem of poverty in Indonesia: the gap between the
rich and the poor is very big unproportionally
4. A mechanism that we can use to
measure the inequality condition in a country is Lorentz curve (Samuelson and
Nordhaus:1995, Arya and Lardner:1999, Berndt:1991, Wynne:2002). We will
modify the Lorentz curve hence we can get how the economical equality has been
approached by Indonesia theoretically.
We assume that there is no person in the country that does not use the oil
for the needs, at least the household needs that industrialized by using oil.
Henceforth, in an x-y cartesian graph we can say that the function y=x is the
ideal (perfect) equality of the population’s usage on oil, while 10% of the poorest
uses 10% of the oil-resources, 20% of the poorest uses 20% of the oil-resources,
and so forth. The deviation of the actual oil distribution from perfect equality is
measured by the amount by which the actual Lorentz curve departs from the
straight line y=x. This will be graphed as function of y=f(x) that placed under the
ideal graph. We assume that y=f(x) as standard quadratic-equation y=f(x)=ax
2
+(1-a)x, while a is constant (See figure 1). If the Lorentz curve is close to the
straight line, energy will be distributed approximately uniformly, while a large
departure from the line indicates considerable inequality of distribution.
Then we can define the coefficient of inequality distribution of energy of the
Lorentz curve as the ratio of the area between the curve y=f(x) and the line y=x
with the area under the line y=x. Mathematically, we can say that the coefficient
of inequality is given by L = 2 . area between Lorentz curve and the line y=x, or
                                                          
4 While this fact cannot be measured well by using formal Gini Index, as described by Abuzar Asra on
his paper in the Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Poverty and Inequality in Indonesia. He found
that the agregate method cannot be trusted scientifically thus scientific approach must use the
disagregate method in order to gain empirical conditions that reflects actual reality. As a matter of fact,
he used the data from the National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) and Statistics Bureau (BPS).
This fact shall be a reflection on our statistical measurement on Indonesia’s conditions that still need to
be reformed.
Figure 1
The Lorentz curve that shows the equity of the percentage usage of energy used by the
population. The y=x is ideal condition of equity while the y=f(x) below the ideal line is
the actual condition of the percentage usage of energy by the population.
Ideal Lorentz curve






)] ( [ 2 dx x f x L ,( 5 )
where y=f(x) is the equation of the Lorentz curve.
By using the standard quadratic equation of f(x)= ax
2 +(1-a)x, we can
picture some value of a to some conditions of inequality in the country as figure
2. In 2003 the number of the poor is calculated approximately 60 percent (about
120 million people)
5, while the conditions of inequality coefficient is estimated
6
very close to 1. This is probably why the supermarket and sales of many
luxurious and expensive goods into Indonesia is still high in the monetary crisis in
Indonesia (1998-2000). By this conditions, we have an argument that we cannot
believe any further on the calculations of GNP and GDP since the calculations of
the statistical data for Indonesia must be in the aggregate perspectives.
On the rising price of oil in Indonesia, some of economists comment that
subsidizing energy for all income groups is very ineffective.  They argue that the
government could accomplish its welfare objectives more effectively if it does not
rely on subsidized energy but rather provides a direct payment to poor
households (The World Bank:2000). As this cannot be accepted according to
some facts on the corruption mental of the government as IMF itself doubting the
ability for the effective distribution of compensation fund for the oil subsidy
7. By
looking at the estimated inequality coefficient of the population in Indonesia, it is
obvious that the subsidy will help protecting the poor, as by the equation (3) and
(4) the low wage will make the population cannot cope the inflation caused by the
raising oil price.
By using the standard quadratic equation of the inequality thus the
coefficient of the national inequality will depend upon the value of “a”. As
described in the figure 2, while there’s no possibility of not using the oil by each
population, we can say that the worst inequality will be gained when a=1. For
example, about 20% of the poorest population can only get about 10% of the
energy used. This is a very unequal condition when about 20% of the richest can
gain about 28% of the energy reserved.
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Figure 2
Some values of a - the general quadratic equation of Lorentz curve that reflects the
actual condition  y=f(x)=ax
2+(1-a)x. It is obvious that the smaller “a” the more equal
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3. On inequality and the subsidy: luxurious goods taxation
To model the conditions faced by Indonesia, on some limitation or the lack
of plausible statistical data, we will assume that the inequality coefficient on
standard quadratic Lorentz equation: a=1. Taking this assumption we can say
that economical inequality represents the big gap between the rich and the poor.
This is plausible as the high rates of the sales of luxurious goods in Indonesia.
In general, we can say that in the high oil price, the needed oil by the poor
will only for the domestic usage, i.e.: cooking, electricity, and in some rural areas
for the fuel of their works (boat fuel for the fishermen, etc.). In other words, we
can say that the poor will use the oil only for the standard of living expenses. This
is very different with the rich, while beside to cope their basic necessities or
household expenses, they use the oil also to turn on some luxurious goods, such
as electrical generator, cars, luxurious electricity goods, i.e.: air-conditioning,
warm-bathing, etc. Looking at the conditions, we can say apparently that the
usage of the basic necessities by the poor are also cope well by the rich.
Henceforth, the poor needs for oil and energy are the subset of the rich
needs. Mathematically, we can say that,
R P N N ⊂ (6)
where, NP is the expenses of the poor for basic necessities and NR is the expenses
for the usage of energy by the rich. In advanced, we can say then,
NR – Np = ∆P( 7 )
where ∆P is the expenses for the luxurious goods.
While we give notation toil for the subsidy that given by the government (toil < 0),
then,
Np= np + toil and NR= nR + toil, (8)
where np and nR are the expenses basic goods by the poor and the expenses by
the rich, respectively.
Simultaneously, by the equation (7),
∆P = nR + np (9)
We will use the standard quadratic Lorentz equation in advanced, with the
assumption that y=f(x)=ax
2+(1-a)x, within x ≈ n P/N, where N=Np+NR






























By assuming that ∆P=nLG.tLG, where nLG is the price of of the untaxed luxurious
goods and tLG as the luxurious-goods taxation that placed as indirect-progressive
taxation, we can get the equation for the subsidy that must be beared by the
government concerning the value of luxurious tax collected,
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and change of the oil subsidy concerning the taxation on luxurious goods will be
Henceforth, we can measure the suitable energy subsidy for the people
concerning the inequality level of the people as every change in the subsidy will
 :=  change_on_oil_subsidy
np ()  −  nr np () −  −   +   +   −  2 np tLG nr np a nr a np




be backed-up by the taxes revenue for the rich as a taxation on luxurious goods.
An example of the simulation results are presented by figure 3. In figure 3 the
trends to higher or lower the percentage of the taxation of the luxurious goods
are showed by the field regarding the trends of higher or lower the level of
subsidy. While the progressive taxation is in zero point, we can see the fact that it
needs subsidy (in negative point). This happens on the condition of the bad
inequality while there is no any progressive tax that encouraging the rich
becoming more and more consumptive, as they are exploited the poor one.
However, while the consumption luxurious goods decreased it will be the normal
condition to decrease subsidy, step by step as presented by the figure 4. In this
condition, the subsidy changes into the positive value (adding some energy
taxes) will be relevant as occasionally in the established economically countries.
Figure 4
One example of some estimated actual data, of the relation between the subsidy
changes with the progressive taxation that can balance the domestic revenue. The
change of oil subsidy is the solid line and the trends to higher or lower the taxation
are represented by the field among the oil-subsidy line.
Figure 5
The factors of the decreasing the consumptive behavior of the rich that stabilize the
domestic financial conditions as the equality increasing. By this situation, it is
possible to withdraw the subsidy,  even further give some taxation on energy usage.WORKING PAPER B2003
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In this conditions, the people are ready for the competitive arena for the free-
trade market as the equality is high enough while the rich can protect the poor
indirectly.
In reality, it is very awful that recently the government of Indonesia on
the contrary lowering the luxurious taxes, and moreover, the taxes for the
luxurious goods are collected as direct taxes. It will become more efficient and
effective to work as progressive taxation if the progressive taxes for the luxurious
goods labeled as VAT, in other words, as indirect taxes. As it is not secret
anymore that the collution between the tax-collectors with the tax-payers are
usual. By using the indirect taxes for this will eventually makes the works become
efficient, and decreasing the possibility to corrupt.
Comparing to the solution for the protecting the poor that nowadays
become the public policy by the government, the policy to concerning the
progressive taxes is much better. The distribution of coupons for inexpensive
kerosene will on the contrary spoiling the poor and even more the rich. This
solution in advance, makes no preparation into the future agenda to cutting off
the whole subsidy or even make the energy taxes.
4. Conclusion
The domestic oil price in Indonesia is very low compared to the
international one. But this is to be made in order to preserve the citizens,
especially the poor. But the challenge of the global market has given
consequences on the same market price. The subsidy must be cut off. But macro-
economy is very labile. The government shall think on some strategies on how to
cope with the impacts on the withdrawn subsidy.
The hike oil price will give effect to the inflation rate and even to the
probability on social restless, especially unemployment restless. These restless
can even more fatal on the impacts, as the crime rate will eventually rise, and the
economical stability will be bothered.
Indonesia is a kind of country with the gap between the poor and rich very
is big. The economical inequality factors are often not caused rationally; this is
because the corruption and the weak law-enforcement. One strategy to gain two
goals: higher the equality coefficient simultaneously the preparation into the
same market level with the international is by applying the progressive taxes for
the luxurious goods. The progressive taxes will balance the government’s revenue
on the lateness of subsidy but further decrease the consumptive trends on the
rich population in order to higher the equality coefficient.
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